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Abstract
This paper studies, for the first time, the trajectory planning problem in adversarial environments, where the objective is to
design the trajectory of a robot to reach a desired final state despite the unknown and arbitrary action of an attacker. In
particular, we consider a robot moving in a two-dimensional space and equipped with two sensors, namely, a Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) sensor and a Radio Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) sensor. The attacker can arbitrarily spoof
the readings of the GNSS sensor and the robot control input so as to maximally deviate its trajectory from the nominal
precomputed path. We derive explicit and constructive conditions for the existence of undetectable attacks, through which the
attacker deviates the robot trajectory in a stealthy way. Conversely, we characterize the existence of secure trajectories, which
guarantee that the robot either moves along the nominal trajectory or that the attack remains detectable. We show that secure
trajectories can only exist between a subset of states, and provide a numerical mechanism to compute them. We illustrate our
findings through several numerical studies, and discuss that our methods are applicable to different models of robot dynamics,
including unicycles. More generally, our results show how control design affects security in systems with nonlinear dynamics.
Key words: Secure trajectory planning, Spoofing attacks, Undetectable attacks, Cyber-physical security, Nonlinear systems.
1 Introduction
Autonomous robots have rapidly been adopted in a
broad range of applications, including delivery, explo-
ration, surveillance, and search and rescue. Autonomous
robots rely on sensory data to make decisions, plan their
trajectories, and apply controls. Yet, as demonstrated
by recent studies and real world incidents, sensory data
can be accidentally and maliciously compromised, thus
undermining the effectiveness of autonomous operations
in critical and adversarial applications.
Despite recent advances in understanding and enhanc-
ing the security of cyber-physical systems, security tools
for autonomous systems are still of limited applicability
and effectiveness. In this paper we formulate and solve
a secure trajectory planning problem, where the objec-
tive is to design the trajectory of a robot to reach a de-
sired final state despite unknown and arbitrary attacks.
We consider a robot equipped with a Global Naviga-
tion Satellite System (GNSS) sensor and a Radio Signal
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Strength Indicator (RSSI) sensor, and focus on attack-
ers capable of simultaneously spoofing the GNSS read-
ings and sending falsified control inputs to the robot. We
show how the attacker can generate undetectable attacks
that maximally deviate the robot from the nominal and
precomputed path, and study how the trajectory plan-
ner can exploit the RSSI readings to reveal certain at-
tacks. Moreover, we demonstrate the existence of secure
trajectories between certain initial and final configura-
tions, and propose a technique to determine the corre-
sponding control inputs. We remark that, because of the
nonlinearity of RSSI sensor readings, existing security
methods based on linear models are inapplicable in our
setting. In fact, our results show for the first time that
the security of a system with nonlinear dynamics can be
improved by appropriately designing its control inputs.
Related work Security of cyber-physical systems is,
by now, a widely studied topic across the controls and
computer science communities, among others. Yet, most
methods are applicable to static systems or systems with
linear dynamics [1–5], and theoretical results and tools
for the security of systems with nonlinear dynamics are
still critically lacking. Few exceptions are [6], which con-
siders the problem of controlling a system under attack
in a game-theoretic framework, [7], which focuses on
Preprint submitted to Automatica 25 October 2019
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
10
86
9v
2 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
4 O
ct 
20
19
nonlinear systems satisfying differential flatness proper-
ties, and the recent articles [8, 9], which are however re-
stricted to state the estimation problem in the presence
of attacks modifying the system measurements only. In-
stead, in this work we focus on characterizing detectabil-
ity of attacks modifying both the measurements and the
input of the system, on quantifying their effects on the
trajectories, and on the problem of designing nominal
control inputs to restrict or prevent undetectable at-
tacks.
The literature on GNSS spoofing attack mechanisms
and their detection is also related to this paper. Exist-
ing approaches to identify and prevent spoofing attacks
can be divided into two categories: filtering-based and
redundancy-based techniques. Filtering-based detection
techniques rely on signal processing methods to reveal
compromised streams of sensory data (e.g., see [10,11]).
Redundancy-based techniques, instead, rely on the avail-
ability of measurement from multiple types of sensors
to reveal inconsistency in the data (e.g., see [12–17]).
The methods developed in this work combine these two
principles. In fact, detection is achieved by processing
the sensory data over time, thus ensuring compatibil-
ity between the measurements and the robot dynamical
model, and by processing the measurements of two or
more sensors, thus exploiting redundancy across the two
channels.
Paper contribution This paper features four main
contributions. First, we demonstrate the existence and
characterize the form of undetectable attacks, that is,
coordinated attack inputs that deviate the robot tra-
jectory from the nominal path and cannot be detected
using the GNSS and RSSI readings. Second, we demon-
strate how an attacker can design optimal undetectable
attacks that maximally deviate the robot from its nom-
inal path while maintaining undetectability. Third, we
show the existence of secure trajectories where, indepen-
dently of the intensity of the attack, the robot either fol-
lows the nominal precomputed path or readily detects
the attack. Fourth, we formulate and solve the secure
trajectory planning problem, which asks for the design
of open-loop control inputs that allow the robot to se-
curely navigate from a given initial configuration to a
certain final position. As a minor contribution, we study
and characterize undetectable attacks and secure tra-
jectories for robots with unicycle dynamics, thus show-
ing that our techniques are in fact applicable to differ-
ent nonlinear dynamical robot models and sensors. More
generally, our results show that secure trajectories can
be substantially different from minimum-time trajecto-
ries, and thus demonstrate that the security of a system
with nonlinear dynamics depends upon the inputs to the
system adopted for control.
Paper organization The remainder of the paper is or-
ganized as follows. Section 2 presents our problem setup
and attack model. Section 3 contains our notion of un-
detectability and our characterization of undetectable
attacks. Section 4 and Section 5 contain, respectively,
the design of optimal undetectable attacks and of secure
trajectories. Finally, Section 6 contains an extension of
our results to the case of robots with unicycle dynamics,
and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Problem setup and preliminary notions
We consider a robot with double-integrator dynamics,[
p˙n
v˙n
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˙n
=
[
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+
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B
un, (1)
where pn : R≥0 → R2 denotes the robot position, vn :
R≥0 → R2 the robot velocity, and un : R≥0 → R2 the
nominal control input that actuates the acceleration of
the robot. The control input un is the design parameter
that is used to plan the nominal robot trajectory be-
tween two desired configurations. We assume that un is
piecewise continuous, and that
‖un‖ ≤ umax,
where umax ∈ R>0. We let the robot be equipped with
two noiseless sensors: a GNSS receiver that provides an
absolute measure of the position, and a RSSI sensor that
provides a measure of the relative distance between the
robot and a base station located at the origin of the
reference frame. Specifically, the sensor readings are
yGNSSn = pn, and y
RSSI
n = p
T
npn. (2)
Although our results can be extended to include different
sensors, we focus on GNSS and RSSI sensors because
they are available in many practical applications [18].
We consider scenarios where the robot operates in an
adversarial environment, where adversaries can simulta-
neously (i) spoof the GNSS signal yGNSSn , and (ii) com-
promise the control input un. The robot dynamics in the
presence of attacks are[
p˙
v˙
]
︸︷︷︸
x˙
=
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02 I2
02 02
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
[
p
v
]
︸︷︷︸
x
+
[
02
I2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
u, (3)
where u ∈ R2 denotes the attacked control input that
obeys the bound on the maximum acceleration ‖u‖ ≤
umax, and
yGNSS = p+ uGNSS, and yRSSI = pTp, (4)
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where uGNSS : R≥0 → R2 denotes the GNSS spoofing
signal. Finally, we make the practical assumption that,
at time t = 0, the nominal and attacked configurations
satisfy xn(0) = x(0).
In the remainder of this paper, we will denote the state
by x = [pT, vT]T or p and v interchangeably, depending
on the context. In particular, we let x = [x1, x2, x3, x4]
T,
and p = [px, py]T = [x1, x2]
T, v = [vx, vy]T = [x3, x4]
T.
Remark 1 (Spoofing attack mechanism) Well-
known vulnerabilities of GNSS are conventionally as-
sociated with the lack of appropriate encryption in the
signals that are broadcast by the satellite system. A
typical framework to cast spoofing attacks consists in a
receiver-spoofer antenna [19] that is capable of sensing
the authentic GNSS signals and of rebroadcasting falsi-
fied streams of information at a higher signal intensity.
The retransmitted signals are typically designed in a way
to induce the GNSS receiver to resynchronize with the
spoofed information, for instance by gradually increasing
the intensity of the retransmission. Once the onboard
receiver has resynchronized with the falsified signals, an
attacker can arbitrarily decide the GNSS data received
by the robot, resulting in (4). A more in-depth discussion
of common spoofing schemes and the required hardware
can be found in e.g. [19, 20].
In common mobile robotic applications, robots commu-
nicate wirelessly with a ground control station, that is re-
sponsible to compute the actions and control inputs to be
executed by the robot. The use of wireless communication
constitutes a possible vulnerability that can be modeled as
in (3). See [21] for a discussion of common vulnerabili-
ties of wireless communication in commercial Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAV). 
In this work we consider two problems that formalize the
contrasting objectives of an attacker, that is, to deviate
the robot trajectory while remaining undetected, and
the trajectory planner, that is, to design a trajectory
between two configurations that is robust to attacks. We
refer to the latter problem to as the secure trajectory
planning problem. In particular, the attacker aims to
design the attack inputs (u, uGNSS) so that
(i) the deviation between the robot nominal trajectory
and the actual (attacked) trajectory is maximized;
and
(ii) the attack remains undetected (as defined below).
Instead, the secure trajectory planning problem asks for
a nominal control input un to guarantee that
(iii) in the absence of attacks, un allows the robot to
reach a desired final state; and
(iv) in the presence of attacks, attacks are detectable
(see below) by processing the signals un, y
GNSS, and
yRSSI.
Two observations are in order. First, although the prob-
lem of trajectory planning has a long history in robotics
(e.g., see [22]), the problem of designing trajectories in
adversarial environments has not been studied before.
Second, the large body of literature on detection and
mitigation of attacks in cyber-physical systems with lin-
ear dynamics (e.g., see [2, 3]) is not applicable to the
considered secure trajectory planning problem, since the
system model is nonlinear due to (4). As we show later
in this paper, and differently from the case of systems
with linear dynamics, attack detectability for nonlinear
systems depends also on the control input adopted by
the trajectory planner.
We next formalize the notion of attack undetectability.
Definition 2 (Undetectable attack) The attack
(u, uGNSS) is undetectable if the measurements satisfy,
at all times,
yGNSS = yGNSSn , and y
RSSI = yRSSIn ,
and it is detectable otherwise. 
Loosely speaking, an attack is undetectable if the mea-
surements generated by the attacker are compatible with
their nominal counterparts and with the robot dynam-
ics at all times. On the other hand, if the conditions in
Definition 2 are not satisfied, then the attack is readily
detected by simple comparison between the nominal and
actual measurements.
Remark 3 (Attack detectability in the presence of
noise) In this work we characterize undetectable attacks
and secure trajectories for deterministic systems. When
the dynamics or the sensors are driven by noise, different
and more relaxed notions of attack detectability should
be adopted, as done for instance in [3] for the case of lin-
ear dynamics. Loosely speaking, undetectable attacks are
easier to cast in stochastic systems, because an attacker
has the additional possibility of hiding its action within
the noise limits. Thus, the conditions derived in this pa-
per for deterministic systems serve as fundamental lim-
itations also for stochastic systems. 
Finally, we combine the objectives of the attacker and
of the trajectory planner into an optimization problem
of the general form:
max
u,uGNSS
min
un,T
∫ T
0
L(xn, x, t) dt+ V (xn(T ), x(T )),
subject to: Dynamics (1) and (3),
(u, uGNSS) is undetectable, (5)
where T ∈ R>0 represents the planning horizon, L :
R4 × R4 × R≥0 → R≥0 is an integral cost, and V :
R4 × R4 → R≥0 is a terminal cost that is chosen to
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penalize deviations between the nominal and attacked
trajectories at the final time. The optimization problem
(5) captures the general class of problems that can be
solved with the framework proposed in this paper, and
will be further specified and discussed in the following
sections.
We observe that (5) is composed of two sequential
phases. In the first phase, the trajectory planner designs
the nominal control input un and the control horizon T
(inner minimization problem) to satisfy the objectives
(iii) and (iv). In the second phase, the attacker designs
the attack inputs (u, uGNSS) given the nominal input un
(outer maximization problem) to satisfy objectives (i)
and (ii). Further, we note that (5) can be interpreted
as a Stackelberg game [23], where undetectable attacks
represent the best response among all strategies that
can be adopted by the attacker, and secure trajecto-
ries represent the strategy that maximizes the payoff of
the trajectory planner, anticipating the fact that the
attacker will adopt its best response.
Remark 4 (Control mechanism and attacker in-
formation) Our formulation (5) reflects a control
framework where the trajectory of the robot is planned in
an open-loop fashion at the beginning of the control hori-
zon by a remote control station, and the resulting control
parameters are then transmitted in batch to the robot [18].
Our assumptions are motivated by the vulnerabilities of
wireless communication, through which an attacker can
intercept the information transmitted to the robot. Thus,
to successfully cast undetectable attacks, the attacker
is required to know the robot dynamics and the nomi-
nal trajectory ahead of time. These requirements can be
relaxed in the case of single integrator dynamics [24]. 
Remark 5 (Undetectability with GNSS sensor) In
scenarios where GNSS is the only sensor for detection,
an adversary can deliberately alter the control input while
remaining undetected. To see this, notice that the effect
of any attack u can be canceled from the GNSS reading
by selecting uGNSS = pn−p. Thus, secure trajectories for
the considered attack model do not exist if the robot has
no redundancy to combine with the GNSS readings. 
3 Characterization of undetectable attacks
In this section we characterize the class of undetectable
attacks and the resulting attacked trajectories. First,
we establish a relationship between the nominal and at-
tacked instantaneous position and velocity. Then, we de-
rive an explicit expression of undetectable attacks, and
demonstrate how an attacker can readily design attacks
that escape detection. The following result relates attack
trajectories with their nominal counterparts.
p(t1)
pn(t1)
pn(t2)
p(t2)
v(t2)
vTp
vTn pn
vn(t2)
Fig. 1. Nominal (blue) and undetectable attack (red) trajec-
tories. At all times, the two trajectories have equal distance
from the base station, and equal velocity components along
the direction of the instantaneous position (green segments).
Lemma 6 (Undetectable trajectories) Let (u, uGNSS)
be an undetectable attack. Then,
pTp = pTnpn, and v
Tp = vTn pn.
PROOF. The first equality in the statement follows by
substitution of (2) and (4) into Definition 2. Further, by
taking the time-derivative on both sides of the equality
pTp = pTnpn, and by using the assumption xn(0) = x(0),
we obtain 2p˙Tp = 2p˙Tnpn at all times, from which the
statement follows. 
From Lemma 6, trajectories generated by undetectable
attacks are characterized by two features: at all times,
(i) the distance pTp between the attacked position and
the RSSI-base station must equal the distance pTnpn in
the nominal trajectory, and (ii) the component of the
velocity v along the position pmust equal the component
of the nominal velocity vn along pn. These two geometric
properties are illustrated in Fig. 1. Next, we give an
implicit characterization of undetectable attacks.
Theorem 7 (Implicit characterization of unde-
tectable attacks) The attack (u, uGNSS) is undetectable
if and only if
uTp = uTnpn + ‖vn‖2 − ‖v‖2, and uGNSS = pn − p. (6)
PROOF. (Only if) By substitution of (2) and (4) into
Definition 2 we readily obtain p + uGNSS = pn, from
which the second identity in the statement follows. To
show the first identity, we note that for every unde-
tectable attack u the identity yRSSI−yRSSIn = 0 holds. We
then make explicit the dependence on the control input
in the above identity by taking the second-order deriva-
tive with respect to time. This yields y¨RSSI− y¨RSSIn = 0.
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Then,
0 = y¨RSSI − y¨RSSIn = 2uTp+ 2vTv − 2uTnun − 2vTn vn,
from which (6) follows. We emphasize that the functions
y˙RSSI, y¨RSSI, y˙RSSIn , y¨
RSSI
n are piecewise continuous func-
tions, since the signals yRSSI and yRSSIn are continuous
and twice differentiable at all times. To see this, we com-
bine the piecewise continuity assumption on un and u
with the dynamical equations (1) and (3), and note that
the velocities vn and v and the positions pn and p are
continuous and differentiable functions of time.
(If) Let uGNSS = pn − p. Substituting into (4) yields
yGNSS − yGNSSn = p+ uGNSS − pn = 0,
from which the first condition in Definition 2 follows. To
prove RSSI undetectability, let u satisfy (6). Then,
y¨RSSI − y¨RSSIn = 2uTp+ 2vTv − 2uTnpn − 2vTn vn = 0,
from which we readily obtain the identity y¨RSSI−y¨RSSIn =
0. Since the functions yRSSI and yRSSIn are continuous
and twice differentiable, and the initial conditions satisfy
p(0) = pn(0) and v(0) = vn(0) we conclude that y˙
RSSI−
y˙RSSIn = 0 and y
RSSI − yRSSIn = 0. Thus, yRSSI = yRSSIn
at all times, which implies undetectability of the attack
u and concludes the proof. 
Finally, we exploit Theorem 7 to give an explicit and
comprehensive characterization of undetectable attacks.
Corollary 8 (Explicit characterization of unde-
tectable attacks) The attack (u, uGNSS) is undetectable
if and only if it satisfies
u = ar p+ w and u
GNSS = pn − p, (7)
whenever ‖p‖ 6= 0, where wTp = 0 and
ar =
uTnpn + ‖vn‖2 − ‖v‖2
‖p‖2 .
Corollary 8 provides a systematic way to design un-
detectable attacks by designing the attack inputs
(u, uGNSS). We also note that the input w can be arbi-
trarily selected by the attacker and it does not affect
detectability of the attack. Finally, it should be noticed
that ar corresponds to the radial acceleration of the
robot, that is, the projection of u along p, and that the
attack input u is unconstrained when ‖p‖ = 0 (see also
Theorem 7).
4 Design of optimal undetectable attacks
In this section we design undetectable attacks that in-
troduce maximal deviations between the nominal and
attacked trajectories. Assuming that the attacker knows
the nominal control input, we address the optimal con-
trol problem
max
w
‖p(T )− pn(T )‖,
subject to x˙ = Ax+Bu, (8a)
u = ar p+ w, (8b)
ar = (u
T
npn + ‖vn‖2 − ‖v‖2)‖p‖−2, (8c)
‖u‖ ≤ umax. (8d)
In the maximization problem (8), constraint (8a) cor-
responds to the attacked dynamics (3), while (8b)-(8c)
enforce attack-undetectability from Corollary 8. We
next characterize the optimality conditions of the prob-
lem (8). Let ei denote the i-th canonical vector of
appropriate dimension, and let sgn( ) denote the sign
function.
Theorem 9 (Attack optimality conditions) Let ar
be as in (8c), and let w∗ be an optimal solution to (8).
Then,
w∗ = atWx,
where
at = − sgn(λTBWx)
√
u2max/‖p‖2 − a2r ,
W =
[
−e2 e1 02 02
]
,
and λ and x satisfy
x˙ = Ax+ arBp+Bw
∗,
−λ˙ = (ATλ+ arP˜ + atW˜ )λ+ (xTP˜ λ+ 2arν‖pn‖2)∇xar,
with boundary conditions
x(0) = xn(0), and λ(T ) = −2[(p(T )− pn(T ))T 0T2 ]T,
where P˜ = PTBT, W˜ = WTBT,∇xar = 2‖p‖−2[0T2 vT]T,
and ν = −λTBWx2at‖p‖2 .
PROOF. To formalize the result, we make use of the
fact that any undetectable attack (7) can be written in
the form
u = ar Px+ at Wx, (9)
where P = [e1 e2 0 0] ∈ R2×4, W = [−e2 e1 0 0] ∈ R2×4,
and at : R≥0 → R. Following expression (9), the func-
tion at represents the new design parameter in the op-
timization problem. To derive the optimality conditions
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for (8), we use the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle [25],
combined with the direct adjoining method for mixed
state-input constraints [26]. We incorporate (8b) and (9)
into (8a) and define the Hamiltonian
H(x, at, λ, t) = λT(Ax+B(arPx+ atWx)),
where λ : [0, T ] → R4 is a vector function of system
costates, with the additional constraints
x(0) = xn(0), ar =
uTnpn + ‖vn‖2 − ‖v‖2
‖p‖2 , ‖u‖ ≤ umax.
We then use (9) to rewrite the bound ‖u‖ ≤ umax as
a2r‖pn‖2 + a2t‖pn‖2 ≤ u2max,
and form the Lagrangian by adjoining the Hamiltonian
with the considered state constraint:
L(x, at, λ, t, ν) = H(x, at,λ, t)+
ν(a2r‖pn‖2 + a2t‖pn‖2 − u2max),
where ν : [0, T ] → R is the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the state constraint.
By application of the Maximum Principle [26], the op-
timal control input a∗t minimizes the Hamiltonian over
the set U(x) = {at : a2r‖p‖2 + a2t‖p‖2 ≤ u2max}, that is,
a∗t = arg minat∈U(x)H(x, at, λ, t). This fact yields the
optimal control law
a∗t = − sgn(λTBWx)
√
u2max/‖p‖2 − a2r .
Moreover, it follows from the Maximum Principle that
there exists a vector function of system costates λ that
satisfies the following system of equations
x˙ =
∂L
∂λ
⇒ x˙ = Ax+B(ar Px+ atWx),
−λ˙ = ∂L
∂x
⇒ −λ˙ =ATλ+ arPTBTλ+ xTPTBTλ∇xar+
atW
TBTλ+ 2arν‖pn‖2∇xar
0 =
∂L
∂at
⇒ 0 = λTBWx+ 2νat‖p‖2,
where ∇xar denotes the gradient of ar with respect to
x, and with boundary conditions
x(0) = xn(0), and λ(T ) =
∂
∂x
‖p(T )− pn(T )‖.
The statement of the theorem follows by substituting the
expression of the gradient ∇xar = 2‖p‖−2[0 0 vT]T. 
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Fig. 2. For an idle robot at position (1, 0) (blue dot),
(a) shows an optimal undetectable attack trajectory, which
maintains a distance equal to 1 from the base station and
maximises the distance from the nominal position. Fig. (b)
shows the radial and tangential components of the accelera-
tion. Fig. (c) shows the velocity of the attacked robot, which
becomes zero when the robot reaches the final point (−1, 0).
From Theorem 9, optimal undetectable attacks can be
computed by solving a two-point boundary value prob-
lem [27]. This class of problems is typically solved nu-
merically, and it may lead to numerical difficulties for
general cases [27]. To conclude this section and provide
some intuition in the design of optimal undetectable at-
tacks, we next present an example where optimal attacks
can be characterized explicitly.
Example 10 (Undetectable trajectories for idle
robots) Let pn(0) = [1 0]
T, vn(0) = 0, and un = 0,
so that the robot remains at position pn(0) at all times.
Let umax = 1 and T = 5. Under these assumptions, the
following control inputs satisfy the optimality conditions
in Theorem 9:
a∗t =
{
ζ
√
u2max − a2r , t ∈ [0, τ ],
−ζ√u2max − a2r , t ∈ [τ, T ], and ar = −‖v‖2,
(10)
where τ = 3.475, and ζ ∈ {−1, 1}. It is worth noting
that, because at every time the radial acceleration is pro-
portional to the square of the magnitude of the velocity,
the control input (10) leads the attacked robot to perform
a circular motion around the origin (see Fig. 2). Notice
that ζ = −1 and ζ = 1 achieve counterclockwise and
clockwise motion, respectively. Finally, (10) is an opti-
mal solution to the optimization problem (8) since the
deviation ‖p(T ) − pn(T )‖ is maximized, as graphically
illustrated in Fig. 2.
To derive the value of the final time τ ,we can explicitly
derive a an expression for the magnitude of the velocity
vector n := ‖v‖, that reads n˙ = √u2max − n2, where we
have substituted the expression for ar into a
∗
t , and used
the fact that n is independent of ar. To obtain the value
6
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Fig. 3. For a nominal straight line trajectory (blue), the fig-
ure shows the undetectable attack trajectories obtained from
Theorem 9 for different values of the nominal acceleration
‖un‖/umax. As the nominal acceleration decreases, the devi-
ation induced by an optimal attack increases. Simulation pa-
rameters: T = 1.5, v(0) = 0, and un = [1,−1]T at all times.
of τ , we seek for the time needed to steer n(t) from umax
to a full stop, by letting n(0) = umax and n(τ) = 0. 
We show in Fig. 3 a set of simulations that illustrate the
effects of optimal attacks (red) when the nominal trajec-
tory is the shortest path between the initial and the final
position (blue). In particular, the figure demonstrates
that increasing levels of deviation are achieved by the
attacker when the trajectory planner employs control
inputs with decreasing magnitude (i.e., different and de-
creasing fractions of umax).
5 Design of secure trajectories
In this section we address the secure trajectory planning
problem. First, we characterize the existence of secure
trajectories as a function of the initial and final config-
urations of the robot. Then, we formulate and solve an
optimization problem to design control inputs that gen-
erate secure trajectories to reach a desired final config-
uration. We start with some necessary definitions. We
say that a trajectory xn is secure if, independently of the
attack u, one of the following mutually exclusive condi-
tions is satisfied:
(C1) p = pn at all times; or
(C2) if p 6= pn at some time, the attack u is detectable.
Similarly, a control input is secure if it generates a secure
trajectory. We next characterize secure control inputs
explicitly.
Theorem 11 (Secure control inputs) Let xn be the
trajectory generated by un. Then, un is secure if and only
if the following conditions hold simultaneously:
(1) there exists a function κ : R≥0 → {−1, 1} satisfying
un = κ
pn
‖pn‖umax, (11)
(2) the trajectory xn satisfies pn 6= 0 at all times.
PROOF. (If ) We assume (1)-(2) and show that either
(C1) or (C2) is satisfied. We distinguish among two
cases.
(Case 1) The attack (u, uGNSS) does not satisfy the un-
detectability condition (6). Then, (C2) follows.
(Case 2) The attack (u, uGNSS) satisfies the unde-
tectability condition (6). Under this assumption we now
show that (1)-(2) imply (C1). We first consider the time
instant τ = 0. By using the assumption xn(τ) = x(τ),
which yields pn(τ) = p(τ) and ‖vn(τ)‖ = ‖v(τ)‖, and
by substituting into (6) we obtain the following unde-
tectability condition valid at time τ :
uTn(τ)pn(τ) = u
T(τ)p(τ). (12)
By taking the 2-norm on both sides of the above equality,
and by substituting the expression (11) we obtain
umax‖pn(τ)‖ = |un(τ)Tpn(τ)| =
|uT(τ)p(τ)| ≤ umax‖p(τ)‖,
where we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Since ex-
act equality must hold, the vectors u(τ) and p(τ) are
linearly dependent and ‖u(τ)‖ = umax, that is,
u(τ) = γ(τ)
p(τ)
‖p(τ)‖umax,
where γ(τ) ∈ {−1, 1}. Finally, we note that γ(τ) 6= κ(τ)
results in a violation of (12), and therefore u(τ) = un(τ).
As a result, pn(τ
+) = p(τ+). To conclude the proof,
we iterate the above reasoning for all τ ∈ [0, T ), from
which (C1) follows.
(Only if ) We show that (C1)-(C2) imply (1)-(2) or,
equivalently, if (1)-(2) do not simultaneously hold, then
(C1)-(C2) are not satisfied. We distinguish two cases.
(Case 1) Let u¯n be any control input that does not sat-
isfy (11). That is, there exists t¯ ∈ [0, T ], such that
u¯n(t) = un(t) for all t ∈ [0, t¯), and u¯n(t¯) 6= un(t¯).
Let u¯ be an attack input, with u¯ = a¯r p+ w¯ as in Corol-
lary 8. We take the absolute value of (7) and use the
relationship ‖vn(t¯)‖ = ‖v(t¯)‖ to obtain the inequality
|a¯r(t¯)| = |u¯
T
n(t¯)pn(t¯)|
‖p(t¯)‖ < umax,
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where strict inequality follows from the assumption
u¯n(t¯) 6= un(t¯). As a result, any vector w¯ that satisfies
‖a¯r(τ)p(τ) + w¯(τ)‖ = umax, is a nonzero undetectable
attack that violates (C1) and (C2).
(Case 2) There exists t¯ ∈ [0, T ], such that ‖pn(t¯)‖ = 0.
It follows from (6) that whenever pn(t¯) = 0 any attack
input is unconstrained at time instant t¯. As a result, any
u with u(t) = un(t) for all t ∈ [0, t¯) and u(t¯) 6= un(t¯) is
undetectable and violates (C1) and (C2). 
Theorem 11 provides an explicit characterization of se-
cure control inputs, and it shows that any secure control
input has maximum magnitude umax at all times, and
its direction is aligned with the direction of the posi-
tioning vector. We next show that any secure trajectory
evolves on an invariant manifold of the state space that
is uniquely defined by the initial state of the robot.
Lemma 12 (Invariant manifold of secure trajec-
tories) Let xn be the trajectory generated by the secure
control input un. Then, xn ∈ S at all times, where
S = {x : x1x4 − x2x3 = x1(0)x4(0)− x2(0)x3(0)}.
PROOF. Let xn = [x1 x2 x3 x4]
T denote the solution to
(1) with initial condition xn(0), subject to control inputs
that satisfy (1)-(2) in Theorem 11. To prove that xn ∈ S,
we equivalently show that the quantity x1x4 − x2x3 is
time-invariant, that is, ddt (x1x4 − x2x3) = 0. In fact,
x˙1x4 + x1x˙4 − x˙2x3 − x2x˙3 = 0,
where the last equality follows by substitution of (1). 
Lemma 12 shows that secure trajectories are constrained
to evolve on a manifold that is defined by the initial state
of the robot, and it implies that only a subset of the
state space can be reached via secure trajectories. These
observations are illustrated in the next example.
Example 13 (Reachable configurations) Let
xn(0) = [x¯1 0 x¯3 0]
T, where x¯1 ∈ R>0 and x¯3 ∈ R, that
is, let the robot at time t = 0 be located on the horizon-
tal axis, with initial velocity in the horizontal direction.
From Lemma 12, every secure trajectory satisfied xn ∈ S
at all times, with
S = {x : x1x4 − x2x3 = 0}.
It should be observed, however, that secure trajectories
may in fact be constrained on a strict subset of S. In fact,
by combining the system dynamics (1) with the secure
control input (11), we obtain
x1 > 0, x2 = 0, x4 = 0,
which is a strict subset of S. Notice that the above equa-
tions imply that the motion of the robot under secure con-
trol inputs is constrained on the positive x-axis. 
To determine a secure trajectory from the initial position
pI with given velocity vI towards the final position pF,
we consider the optimization problem 1
min
κ,T
T + ‖pn(T )− pF‖,
subject to x˙n = Axn +Bun,
pn(0) = pI, vn(0) = vI,
un = κ
pn
‖pn‖umax, (13)
which aims to find a secure control input that minimizes
a weighted combination of the distance to the desired
final position and the time needed to reach such position.
The following result characterizes the solutions to the
optimization problem (13).
Theorem 14 (Optimality conditions for secure
control inputs) Let κ∗ and T ∗ be an optimal solution
to (13). Then,
κ∗ = − sgn(λTBpn), and T ∗ = ξ,
where ξ ∈ R>0, xn, and λ satisfy
x˙n = ξ(Axn +
κ∗ umax
‖pn‖ Bpn),
−λ˙ = ξ(ATλ+ κ
∗ umax
‖pn‖3 Φ(pn)B
Tλ),
ξ˙ = 0, (14)
for all t ∈ [0, 1], with boundary conditions
xn(0) = x0,
λ(1) = 2[(p(T )− pn(T ))T0T2 ]T,
λ(0)(Ax0 +Bκ
∗(0)
pn(0)
‖pn(0)‖umax) = −1,
and
Φ(pn) =
(‖pn‖2I2 − 2pnpTn)
[
I2 02
02 02
]
.
PROOF. To determine the unknown final time T we
employ a technique similar to [28] and let t = ξτ , where
ξ ∈ R>0 is a constant unknown parameter, and τ is the
1 In the optimization problem, we allow a free final velocity
to ensure that the final configuration achieved belongs to the
invariant manifold that constraints the secure trajectory.
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new temporal variable, with 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. We then use
The Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle [25] to derive the
optimality conditions for the optimization problem (13),
and consider the Hamiltonian
H(xn, κ, λ) = 1 + λTξ(Axn +Bun),
where λ is the vector function of system costates. By
application of the Maximum Principle [25], the optimal
control input and corresponding trajectory satisfy the
following optimality conditions
x˙n =
∂H
∂λ
⇒ x˙n = ξ(Axn +Bun),
−λ˙ = ∂H
∂xn
⇒ −λ˙ = ξ(ATλ+ ∂un
∂xn
BTλ),
with boundary conditions xn(0) = x0 and λ(1) =
∂V
∂x (x(1)), where we used the fact 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. To derive
an expression for the partial derivative of un with respect
to xn we let P = [e1 e2 0 0] ∈ R2×4 and rewrite (11) as
un = κ
Pxn
‖Pxn‖umax,
which yields
∂un
∂xn
=
κumax
‖pn‖ P− 2
κumax
‖pn‖3 Pxnx
T
nP
TP.
Hence, the expression for Φ(pn) follows by substitution.
To determine the unknown final time, we consider the
additional differential equation ξ˙ = 0, and let ξ be an
unknown parameter. In particular, to determine the ad-
ditional boundary condition we use the fact that the
Hamiltonian is independent of time and the final time
is free. Thus, the Hamiltonian is a first integral along
optimal trajectories [25], i.e., H(xn, κ, λ) = const., with
H(xn, κ, λ)|t=0 = 0, which yield the claimed boundary
conditions and the statement follows. 
Theorem 14 allows us to compute secure control inputs
by solving a two-point boundary value problem [27]. We
propose in Fig. 4 (see also corresponding data in Ta-
ble 1) a comparison between a secure trajectory and a
minimum time trajectory (non secure). In particular,
a minimum-time trajectory is obtained by numerically
solving the following optimization problem
min
un,T
T + ‖pn(T )− pF‖,
subject to x˙n = Axn +Bun,
pn(0) = pI, vn(0) = vI,
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
(a)
0 1 2 3 3.84
-1
0
1
(b)
0 0.75 1.5
-1
0
1 T
(c)
Fig. 4. (a) Secure (blue) and minimum time (red) trajectories
between pI = (1, 1) and pF = (−3,−3), with v(0) = [−1, 1]T
and umax = 1. (b) and (c) Corresponding control inputs.
Note that for minimum time trajectories, vectors un and pn
are not aligned at all times.
We note that secure trajectory require longer control
horizons but, differently from minimum-time trajecto-
ries, prevent the existence of undetectable attacks.
(Time) (Attack Deviation)
T max
w
‖p(T )− pn(T )‖
Min. time trajectory 1.5 8.49
Secure trajectory 3.84 0
Table 1
Details for minimum-time and secure trajectories in Fig. 4.
6 Undetectable attacks and secure trajectories
for robots with unicycle dynamics
The goal of this section is to characterize undetectable
attacks and secure trajectories for robots with unicycle
dynamics, so as to illustrate that the methods developed
in this paper are applicable to a broad and general class
of robot models. A robot with unicycle dynamics has
one steerable drive wheel [29], and is modeled through
the dynamical equations
p˙xn = νn cos(θn), p˙
y
n = νn sin(θn), θ˙n = ωn,
where pn = [p
x
n p
y
n] : R≥0 → R2 denotes the robot po-
sition, θn : R≥0 → [0, 2pi) denotes the steering angle,
νn : R≥0 → R≥0 and ωn : R≥0 → R denote the wheel
velocity and steering control, respectively. We assume
9
φn = 30
◦
φ = 60◦
νn = 1
ν = √
3
Fig. 5. Nominal (blue) and undetectable attack (red) trajec-
tories. As discussed in Theorem 15, the illustrated vectors
satisfy ν cos(φ) = νn cos(φn) to guarantee undetectability.
that νn is differentiable, ωn is piecewise continuous, and
that νn ≤ νmax and |ωn| ≤ ωmax, where νmax ∈ R>0 and
ωmax ∈ R>0. Similarly to (3), we model the unicycle dy-
namics in the presence of attacks as
p˙x = ν cos(θ), p˙y = ν sin(θ), θ˙ = ω,
where p = [px py] : R≥0 → R2 and θ : R≥0 → [0, 2pi)
denote, respectively, the position and steering angle of
the robot under attack, while ν : R≥0 → R≥0 and
ω : R≥0 → R denote the attacked wheel velocity and
steering control. As described in Section 2, we assume
that the robot is equipped with a GNSS and an RSSI
sensor, whose measurements are as in (2) in the absence
of attacks, and as in (4) in the presence of attacks.
Using the notions in Definition 2, we next character-
ize undetectable attacks against robots with unicycle
dynamics. In the remainder of this section, we let
angle(v, w) denote the angle between the vectors v
and w, that is
angle(v, w) = arccos
(
vTw
‖v‖‖w‖
)
,
with angle(0, w) = angle(v, 0) = 0.
Theorem 15 (Undetectable attacks for unicycle
dynamics) Let φn = angle(pn, p˙n) and φ = angle(p, p˙).
The attack (ν, ω, uGNSS) is undetectable if and only if
ν cos(φ) = νn cos(φn), and u
GNSS = pn − p. (15)
PROOF. The proof follows by extending the proof of
Theorem 7 to the considered unycicle dynamics. 
An example where the condition in Theorem 15 holds is
illustrated in Fig. 5. Next, we provide a characterization
of secure control inputs for unicycle dynamics.
Theorem 16 (Secure control inputs for unicycle
dynamics) Let φn = angle(pn, p˙n). The control input
(νn, ωn) is secure if and only if the following conditions
hold simultaneously:
(1) φn(0) ∈ {0, pi}, and pn 6= 0 at all times,
(2) νn = νmax and ωn = 0 at all times.
PROOF. (If ) We assume (1)-(2) and show that either
(C1) or (C2) is satisfied. We distinguish among two cases.
(Case 1) The attack (ν, ω, uGNSS) does not satisfy (15).
Then, (C2) immediately follows.
(Case 2) The attack (ν, ω, uGNSS) satisfies (15). We first
focus on the time instant τ = 0, and take the absolute
value on both sides of the undetectability condition (15)
to obtain the identity
|νn(0) cos(φn(0))| = |ν(0) cos(φ(0))|. (16)
By substituting conditions (1)-(2) into the left-hand side
of (16) we obtain
|νn(0) cos(φn(0))| = νmax.
On the other hand, by applying the Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality to the right-hand side of (16) we have
|ν(0) cos(φ(0))| ≤ |ν(0)|| cos(φ(0))| ≤ νmax.
By application of (16), exact equality must hold in the
above bound, and thus we necessarily have ν(0) = νmax
and | cos(φ(0))| = 1. Finally, we use the fact that φ is a
differentiable function of time to obtain φ(0) = φn(0).
To conclude the proof, we use the fact that ωn = 0 at all
times, which implies φn(τ) = φn(0) for all τ (a formal
proof of this fact can be done by leveraging the change
of variables (17) below), and iterate the above reasoning
for all τ ∈ [0, T ) to obtain ν = νn and φ = φn at all
times, from which condition (C1) follows.
(Only if ) We now show that (C1)-(C2) imply (1)-(2) or,
equivalently, if (1)-(2) do not hold, then (C1)-(C2) are
not verified. We distinguish among four cases.
(Case 1) The robot initial conditions are such that
θn(0) 6= {0, pi}, and the nominal control inputs satisfy
νn = νmax and ωn(t) = 0 at all times. We consider the
attack (ν, ω), with
ν˙ =
1
cosφ
(
νnφ˙n sinφn − νφ˙ sin φ˙
)
, and ω 6= 0,
and show that such attack is undetectable and violates
(C1)-(C2). To prove undetectability, we use the fact that
xn(0) = x(0), and equivalently show the identity be-
tween the time derivatives of (15), which yields
−νnφ˙n sinφn = ν˙ cosφ− νφ˙ sinφ,
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where we used the relationship ν˙n = 0 at all times. As a
result, undetectability of the given attack (ν, ω) follows
by substitution. To conclude, we observe that (ν, ω) is
undetectable and violates (C1) and (C2).
(Case 2) There exists t¯ ∈ [0, T ] such that ‖pn(t¯)‖ = 0. It
follows from (15) that, when pn(t¯) = 0, angle(0, p˙n(t¯)) =
0. As a result, attack inputs are unconstrained at time
t¯, and any ω such that ω(t) = ωn(t) for all t ∈ [0, t¯), and
ω(t¯) 6= ωn(t¯), is undetectable and violates (C1)-(C2).
(Case 3) Nominal control inputs satisfy νn = νmax at
all times, ωn(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, t¯), and ωn(t¯) 6= 0,
t¯ ∈ [0, T ]. We perform a change of variables [30]
ρ =
√
p2x + p
2
y,
φ = Atan2(py, px)− θ + pi,
δ = φ+ θ, (17)
which leads to the following dynamical equation φ˙ =
sinφ
‖p‖ − ω that relates φ to the control inputs ν and ω
(see [30]). We then let ν = νn at all times, and
ω =
{
ωn, if t ∈ [0, t¯),
−ωn, if t ∈ [t¯, T ],
from which we obtain
φ˙ =
sinφ
‖p‖ − ω = −
sinφn
‖pn‖ + ωn = −φ˙n,
for all t ∈ [t¯, T ]. By combining the above relationship
with φn(t¯) = φ(t¯) we obtain φ(t) = −φn(t) for all t ∈
[t¯, T ]. To conclude, we note that the given choice of (ν, ω)
leads to an undetectable attack that satisfies (15) and
that violates (C1)-(C2).
(Case 4) Nominal control inputs satisfy ωn = 0 at all
times, νn(t) = νmax for all t ∈ [0, t¯), and νn(t¯) < νmax,
t¯ ∈ [0, T ]. Under these assumptions, we consider the
attack (ν, ω) with ν(t) = νn(t) and ω(t) = ωn(t) for all
t ∈ [0, t¯), and
ν˙ =
1
cosφ
(
ν˙n + νφ˙ sinφ
)
, and ω 6= 0,
for all t ∈ [t¯, T ]. To prove undetectability of the consid-
ered attack, we observe that xn(t¯) = x(t¯), and equiva-
lently show the identity between the time derivatives of
(15) for all t ∈ (t¯, T ], which reads
ν˙n = ν˙ cosφ− νφ˙ sinφ,
where we used the relationships cosφn = 1 and sinφn =
0 at all times. As a result, undetectability of the given
attack follows by substitution. To conclude, we note that
(ν, ω) is undetectable and violates (C1) and (C2). 
From Theorem 16, a secure trajectory exists only if ini-
tial position, final position, and the origin are collinear.
We conclude by observing that this aspect is consistent
with the similar conclusions previously drawn in Theo-
rem 11 and Lemma 12.
Remark 17 (Generality of our methods) The ap-
proach presented in this work for the characterization of
undetectable attacks and the resulting effects on the robot
trajectories can be generalized to a wider class of nonlin-
ear systems and attacks. The approach consists of three
main steps, namely, the characterization of undetectable
trajectories by studying the Lie derivatives of the mea-
surement equations, the characterization of undetectable
inputs and secure trajectories by solving a set of non-
linear algebraic equations akin to (6) and (15), and the
study of the submanifold of the state space that can be
reached by undetectable attacks. While systematic tools
may exist to solve the first two steps for a broad class
of dynamics, the problem of nonlinear constrained con-
trollability in the third step, which is solved in this paper
via numerical optimization, requires the development of
novel control theories and tools. 
7 Conclusions
In this paper we introduce and study the problem of se-
cure trajectory planning, that is, the design of trajec-
tories to guarantee the navigation between two desired
configurations despite the presence of attackers. We fo-
cus on the case where the robot has a GNSS sensor and
a RSSI sensor, and provide an explicit characterization
of secure trajectories, undetectable attacks, and their ef-
fects on the nominal trajectory. Further, we provide nu-
merical algorithms to determine secure trajectories and
optimal attacks, and we illustrate our findings through
a set of examples. To the best of our knowledge, this
work constitutes a first step towards understanding the
fundamental limitations of attack detection algorithms
for systems with nonlinear dynamics. Several aspects
are left as the subject of future investigation, including
a characterization of the set of configurations reachable
by undetectable attacks and secure trajectories, the ex-
tension of the methods to different classes of sensors and
attacks, the development of robust control mechanisms
to operate the system despite the presence of attacks,
and the study of secure trajectories and undetectable
attacks in the presence of sensing and actuation noise.
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